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BYSTANDER LEGISLATION: HE AIN’T HEAVY, HE’S MY 
BROTHER1 
By: Amos N. Guiora* and Jessie E. Dyer** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The words in the title of this article, from the Hollies iconic song, capture 
the essence and power of one individual providing assistance to another. It is the 
most basic of human interactions, reflecting the ability of one person and the 
need of the other. On the face of it, there is nothing particularly complicated or 
complex in such a notion. However, as history repeatedly teaches us and as we 
are reminded on a daily basis, we must not view this as a given. That assumption 
would be a profound mistake with grave consequences. It is for that reason, as 
we articulate in this article, that failure to provide minimal assistance to a person 
in peril must not go unpunished. The words below movingly capture what should 
be obvious to all. 
The road is long, with many a winding turn 
That lead us to (who knows) where, who knows where? 
But I’m strong, strong enough to carry him  
He ain’t heavy – he’s my brother 
So on we go, his welfare is of my concern 
no burden is he to bear, we’ll get there 
For I know he would not encumber me 
He ain’t heavy - he’s my brother 
 
* Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. 
** J.D. Candidate 2020, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah; Ms. Dyer co-wrote this 
article as part of her Quinney Fellowship. A portion of the research for this article was made 
possible through a Research Incentive Seed Grant, which was jointly funded by the University of 
Utah’s Vice President for Research and the S.J. Quinney College of Law. 
The authors would like to thank Scott Balderson, Anne-Marie-Cotton, Christine Hashimoto, Brian 
King, and John C. Lentz, Jr., for their invaluable insights.  
1 The reference is to the classic Hollies song, He Ain’t Heavy, He’s My Brother. See THE HOLLIES, 
HE AIN’T HEAVY, HE’S MY BROTHER (Abbey Road Studios 1969). 
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If I’m laden at all, I’m laden with sadness 
that everyone’s heart isn’t filled with the gladness 
of love for one another. 
It’s a long, long road, from which there is no return 
While we're on the way to there, why not share? 
And the long doesn’t weigh me down at all 
He ain’t heavy – he’s my brother 
He’s my brother – he ain’t heavy – he’s my brother . . .2 
In this article, we address bystander responsibility from the perspective of 
the individual in peril. Why and how the individual is in that condition is 
irrelevant to the recommendation that a duty to act be imposed on the bystander. 
The circumstances that directly, or indirectly, led to the distress are insignificant 
to the legal obligation to intervene on behalf of the person in immediate physical 
peril. 
What is important is the distress of one individual—the victim—and the 
ability of another—the bystander—to mitigate that travail. This is a victim-
focused proposal, emphasizing the assistance required by the person in distress 
and the bystander’s capability to provide immediate relief. It is that combination 
that is essential to understanding the essence of the proposal: distress of person 
A and capability of person B. While the duty, as we shall discuss, may be 
mitigated under certain circumstances, the core recommendation entails 
imposing an obligation to act on the bystander, who does not otherwise owe a 
legal duty to the person requiring assistance. 
A.  The Bystander 
The bystander is the person who observes another individual in distress, 
knows of that person’s travail, and has the capability to act on their behalf. The 
bystander is present at the moment of another person’s acute need. The question 
is whether the bystander will act on behalf of that person or not act by choosing 
to walk away. Re-stated, will the bystander provide assistance or deliberately 
and knowingly ignore, thereby committing a crime of omission? Should the 
bystander choose to walk away, whilst having both the knowledge of the distress 
of another and the capability to mitigate the harm, the bystander is culpable of a 
criminal act. 
We define assistance narrowly: just dial “911,” thereby alerting the 
authorities as to the dire circumstances of another individual. Adoption of 
legislation would punish the bystander for failing to provide the victim with 
concrete assistance. Commensurate with a significant educational undertaking, 
it would also serve as a deterrent to the broader public: failure to provide 
assistance to the person in peril will result in criminal prosecution.  
Similar legislation has been adopted in ten states and a number of countries, 
 
2 Id. 
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reflecting a fundamental re-structuring of the relationship between individuals 
and significantly extending beyond a moral obligation.3 Relying on an 
aspirational model is, perhaps, satisfying on a basic human level intended to 
accentuate the basic goodness of people. However, that model does not translate 
into reality when examined under a bright light on the proverbial operating table. 
It is for that reason that we have joined forces with Utah State 
Representative Brian King, who has twice introduced legislation that defines the 
failure to call 911 as a Class B Misdemeanor resulting in a $1,000 fine and/or 
six months imprisonment. In this article, we analyze both State Rep. King’s 
proposed legislation and criminal codes in other jurisdictions regarding the 
bystander duty to act obligation. In addition, we examine in detail the hearings 
before the Utah Judiciary Committee,4 which twice voted in favor of State Rep. 
King’s proposal, and the debate on the Floor of the Utah Legislature, which 
twice voted to defeat the legislation.5 We have had significant interaction with 
legislators, Attorney Generals, and public officials in a number of states and 
countries considering bystander legislation.  
As part of our efforts, we have examined existing bystander legislation in 
ten U.S. states6 and more than two dozen countries7 regarding application in 
those jurisdictions. Our findings are detailed in this article. Furthermore, we 
have interacted with school officials in a number of states, as educating the 
broader public regarding the legal obligation to act would be an essential 
component of the legislative undertaking.   
B.  Legislation 
The essence of “bystander legislation” is criminalizing the failure to act on 
behalf of a person in peril. There is no intent to equate the bystander with the 
perpetrator; the actions of the latter do not equate with the actions or inactions 
of the former. However, the bystander’s decision not to provide assistance 
enables the actions of the perpetrator. In a historical context, the perpetrators of 
the Holocaust were enabled by the complicity of the bystander.8 
 
3 Do You Have to Rescue Someone in Danger?, BBC NEWS (July 21, 2017), https://www.bbc. 
com/news/world-us-canada-40680895 [https://perma.cc/Z5H9-FPW7]. 
4 Duty to Assist in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 125 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 2018 Leg., 
62d Sess. (Utah 2018) [hereinafter Duty to Assist in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 125], 
https://le.utah.gov/av/committeeArchive.jsp?timelineID=105983 [https://perma.cc/S9H2-NP89]; 
911 Responsibilities in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 170 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 2019 
Leg., 63d Sess. (Utah 2019) [hereinafter 911 Responsibilities in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 
170], https://le.utah.gov/av/floorArchive.jsp?markerID=106198 [https://perma.cc/T5P7-PR8Q]. 
5 Duty to Assist in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 125, supra note 4; 911 Responsibilities in an 
Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 170, supra note 4. 
6 Vermont, Washington, Ohio, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Florida, Hawai, Rhode Island, 
Massachusetts, and California. 
7 Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland, and Tunisia. 
8 See generally AMOS N. GUIORA, THE CRIME OF COMPLICITY: THE BYSTANDER IN THE 
HOLOCAUST (2017). 
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Our motivation in this recommendation is two-fold: to ensure that critical 
assistance be provided to the victim and to penalize the bystander who failed to 
act on behalf of that person. In instances of peril resulting from an accident or 
medical emergency, the obligation to act on behalf of that person is similarly 
acute. In both instances, the person in distress is in need of assistance.  
A casual perusal of the news makes the need for this legislation acutely 
clear, sometimes painfully so. The constant drumbeat of attacks, sexual and 
otherwise, emphasize the role of the bystander who knows of the peril of another 
and yet chooses not to act. In so doing, the bystander becomes complicit in the 
consequences to the “at risk” individual.  
The proposed legislation is predicated on the bystander’s physical 
presence; what is presumed to be seen on social media—Facebook or other 
platforms—does not impose a duty on the viewer. Given the uncertainty of 
authenticity regarding events seemingly depicted on social media, extending the 
duty to act in such circumstances is unwieldly, practically, and legally 
impractical. 
The low bar—dialing 911—imposes a minimal duty on the bystander. 
There is no demand or expectation, that the bystander physically intervene, 
whether providing medical assistance or separating individuals involved in a 
fight. That is not the intention as such actions may have detrimental 
consequences, either from the perspective of the victim or the bystander. In 
recommending minimal action, we seek to strike a careful balance: on the one 
hand, alerting law enforcement; on the other hand, not exposing the bystander 
to unnecessary harm.  
The decision not to intervene is our primary focus. In doing so, we aim to 
convince the reader of the necessity of bystander legislation, for we are of the 
belief that criminalizing bystander failure to provide assistance is warranted 
given the potential consequences of inaction.  
C.  Complicity 
Integral to understanding the essence of the bystander’s failure to provide 
assistance is complicity; the two—bystander and complicity—are powerfully, 
often times tragically, connected. The term “complicity” is not used lightly; it 
carries with it significant connotations by suggesting the bystander enables harm 
to the victim and, therefore, shares some of the responsibility. Complicity is 
ancient but shapes, enables, and permeates contemporary events. It is not by 
chance that Dictionary.com chose “complicit” as the word of the year in 2017.9 
“As 2017 comes to a close, it’s time for us to reflect on the words that impacted 
all of us this year—for better or for worse,” Dictionary.com said in announcing 
its decision.10 The online dictionary continued: “[t]he word complicit has sprung 
up in conversations this year about those who speak out against powerful figures 
 
9 Dictionary.com’s 2017 Word of the Year: Complicit, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary. 
com/e/word-of-the-year-2017/ [https://perma.cc/BU5B-JBBE]. 
10 Id.  
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and institutions and about those who stay silent.”11 
The critical word is “silent”; perhaps more than any other word, it captures 
the essence of the bystander. The three words—silence, complicity, and 
bystander—are essential to understanding the consequences to the victim. 
Tragically, that theme has firm, historical footing: while the evil of the 
perpetrators of the Holocaust has been thoroughly documented, it is equally 
important to recall that without the complicity of the bystander, the Nazi regime 
would not have been able to implement the Final Solution.12 
A victim is anyone suffering, be it because they find themselves the target 
of a crime or due to an unfortunate accident or acute health crisis. In criminal 
situations, a triangular relationship is created between the victim, perpetrator, 




When the victim is in peril due to an accident or health crisis, the 




The two constants are the presence of the victim and bystander and the 
question of whether the latter alleviates the peril of the former. In proposing a 
victim-oriented approach, we emphasize the consequences of the bystander’s 
decision not to act.  
To address these issues, this article will be divided into the following 
sections: Introduction; Why Bystander Legislation: Whom are We Seeking to 
Protect and What are We Seeking to Achieve; Literature Survey; Bystander 
 
11 Amy B. Wang, ‘Complicit’ Is the 2017 Word of the Year, According to Dictionary.com, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 27, 2017, 4:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2017/ 
11/27/complicit-is-the-2017-word-of-the-year-according-to-dictionarycom/?utm_term=.3741b60d 
dea5 [https://perma.cc/GYF3-MJ8T]. 
12 “Final Solution”— 1940 to 1945, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, https://www.ushmm 
.org/information/exhibitions/museum-exhibitions/permanent/final-solution-1940-to-1945 [https:// 
perma.cc/3YK4-GV4K]. 
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Legislation Internationally and in the United States; Application of Bystander 
Legislation; Our Experiences with the Legislative Process in the State of Utah; 
Why is Bystander Legislation a Bad Idea?; Going Forward. Directly following 
Section Seven is an Appendix with the full version of State Rep. King’s 
proposed legislation.  
II.  WHY BYSTANDER LEGISLATION: WHOM ARE WE SEEKING TO PROTECT 
AND WHAT ARE WE SEEKING TO ACHIEVE? 
Efforts to legislate bystander obligation are criticized for a number of 
reasons reflecting the complexity and controversy inherent in criminalizing most 
(but not all) inactions.13 In broad-brush, to be examined in greater detail in the 
sections ahead, the primary concerns regarding such legislation focus on fears 
of prosecutorial abuse of discretion and a belief that bystander obligation is best 
framed as a moral, rather than a legal, duty. As we shall explain, we beg to differ 
with these and other concerns raised by proposal opponents. In doing so, we 
remind readers that our primary focus is on the person in peril, in need of 
immediate assistance.  
The notion of limited duty reflects both political consideration/reality and 
recognition that a bystander who seeks to do “too much” may, unintentionally, 
cause harm to the individual in peril. While “Good Samaritan” legislation 
protects the intervening bystander from legal liability if, in an effort to provide 
assistance, harm was caused, our analysis is to be distinguished. We do not rely 
on Good Samaritan legislation in advocating imposing a legal duty on the 
bystander to act, for we believe the two to be unrelated.  
In not requiring actual, physical intervention by the bystander, the proposed 
model reflects a deliberate effort to strike a careful balance: on the one hand 
requiring action while, on the other hand, doing so in a manner intended both to 
minimize risk to the bystander and potential injury to the person in peril. The 
proposed legislation attempts to strike an applicable/implementable balance 
between the two individuals who have, regardless of circumstances and 
conditions, been brought together and share the same space, where the actions 
of one individual are essential to the welfare of another individual. The sharing 
of that same space—the physicality of the relationship between the bystander 
and person in peril—is, for both individuals, a tenuous connection with 
potentially significant consequences. It is for that reason that the recommended 
duty is minimal. Nevertheless, provided the bystander meets a two-part test 
comprised of knowledge and capability, not imposing an obligation to act further 
enhances the predicament of the individual in distress.  
The broader question and more fundamental inquiry is why impose a legal 
duty rather than relying on a moral foundation reflecting core values of 
humanity, basic respect, and decency amongst individuals? After all, as the oft-
quoted phrase suggests, “we know to do the right thing,” or as was argued in the 
 
13 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Duties to Rescue and the Anticooperative Effects of Law, 88 GEO. L.J. 
105, 108 (1999). 
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Utah State Legislature, “we in Utah are good people.” These arguments are 
cloaked in anecdotal evidence, community myths, and time-worn clichés.  
While, doubtlessly, there are numerous examples of individuals acting on 
behalf of another in distress, to suggest that is a cultural norm reflecting 
consistent normative values and behavior is inaccurate. More than that, that oft-
stated assumption—or perhaps more accurately a reflexive reaction—does not 
reflect the reality of contemporary society. To rely on the quaint notion that the 
right thing will be done is “fool’s gold” and does not, in the main, provide 
protection to the individual in distress. 
What, then, does bystander obligation legislation seek to achieve that 
cannot be otherwise attained? More than that, does the presumed benefit of 
bystander obligation legislation outweigh the costs and consequences of 
punishing a crime of omission? The primary motivation for the legislative 
proposal is two-fold: to punish the bystander who fails to provide assistance and 
to encourage future bystanders to act on behalf of the person in peril. Legislating 
this obligation is intended to impose a duty that is otherwise not codified, albeit 
the opposition to criminalizing omission. However, the discomfort that “crimes 
of omission” inevitably conjure must be weighed against the benefit—to the 
person in peril—by codifying this duty.  
This cost-benefit analysis is integral to understanding the importance and 
relevance of bystander legislation. Imposing the duty to act, particularly when 
there is no pre-existing relationship between the person in peril and the 
bystander, suggests a re-articulation of the Social Contract, for it extends the 
duty one member of society owes to another. This is distinct from, and in 
addition to, the Social Contract between the State and the individual as 
articulated by Rousseau,14 Locke,15 and Hobbes.16 
By extending duty to the bystander, the proposed legislation adds a layer of 
obligation between two individuals who do not have an otherwise pre-existing 
duty to each other. This is distinct from reporting obligations imposed on 
teachers or health care providers to children or others who it is suspected are in 
harm’s way. Similarly, this is distinct from a duty a parent owes a child or that 
of a lifeguard to individuals swimming in a pool. Those duties reflect a 
professional or contractual obligation, much less the primary duty of a parent or 
an adult entrusted with the care of a vulnerable child. Those obligations and 
duties are otherwise codified and largely self-explanatory. The failure to meet 
those obligations are understandably subject to criminal penalty.  
Imposing a duty where there is no pre-existing or contractual duty 
significantly expands the notion of obligation. That “expansion” must be 
understood in its intended context: to mitigate the peril of another individual. 
 
14 See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN AND FOUNDATIONS OF 
INEQUALITY AMONG MEN (Helena Rosenblatt ed., Beford St. Martin’s 2011) (1761). 
15 See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).  
16 See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (J. C. A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) 
(1651). 
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The expansiveness is neither abstract nor ephemeral; rather, it is concrete with 
specific purposes and practical consequences. The extension of “duty owed” to 
include individuals whose “interaction”—however fleeting—may well be 
premised on total randomness and happenstance is to restructure the concept of 
obligation and responsibility. More than that: the two individuals—the person 
in distress and the bystander—possibly do not exchange a word or glance and, 
in all probability, do not know each other’s name. That, however, is irrelevant 
to the duty we seek to impose on the bystander.  
This is, then, a matter of trade-offs: imposition of duty on the bystander, 
potentially resulting in punishment, in exchange for providing assistance, of a 
limited nature, to a person in distress. The proposed duty—limited to dialing 
911—intends to fill an important gap in the criminal code of a number of 
jurisdictions.  
III.  LITERATURE SURVEY 
Under the common law, there is no legal duty to act on behalf of anyone in 
peril. Scholarly discussions have reached different conclusions regarding the 
merits of creating such a legislative requirement.17 
Those who favor the common law tradition argue that imposing liability for 
failing to prevent harm runs contrary to principles of personal autonomy.18 This 
argument focuses on the difference between directly causing harm and simply 
failing to prevent it.19 That is, our criminal law system requires an element of 
causation in order to respect one’s personal autonomy; we are responsible for 
the consequences of our own actions but not the actions of others. Here, the fear 
is that duty to assist laws will “strong arm individuals to act in situations where 
their conscience should be their guides.”20  
The inverse criticism of bystander liability argues that it does not materially 
affect behavior and is thus not worth pursuing. Scholars point to existing 
legislation, arguing that the laws on the books have not been enforced with any 
regularity or consistency.21 This view dismisses the idea of bystander liability, 
describing duty to assist laws as “easily made but rarely enforced.”22  
The relationship between a bystander’s ability and decision to assist has 
evolved with the rising power of social media and overall technological 
 
17 Melody J. Stewart, How Making the Failure to Assist Illegal Fails to Assist: An Observation of 
Expanding Criminal Omission Liability, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 385, 387 (1998); Arthur Alan 
Severance, The Duty to Render Assistance in the Satellite Age, 36 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 377, 399 
(2006); Patricia Grande Montana, Watch or Report? Livestream or Help? Good Samaritan Laws 
Revisited: The Need to Create a Duty to Report, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 533, 536 (2018); Marcia M. 
Ziegler, Nonfeasance and the Duty to Assist: The American Seinfeld Syndrome, 104 DICK. L. REV. 
525, 528 (2000). 
18 Ziegler, supra note 17, at 536. 
19 Id. 
20 Stewart, supra note 17, at 423. 
21 Id. at 424. 
22 Id.  
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advances.23 Technology may also have created a desensitization to violence and 
a decrease in empathy, which make it more likely for bystanders to pull out their 
phones to film an incident rather than dial 911.24 
There are arguments that statutes requiring a duty to act are ineffective and 
do not materially alter behavior.25 This is based on social and physiological 
research, which demonstrates that fear of prosecution does not compel action 
from those who otherwise feel no responsibility to assist a stranger in peril.26 
Instead, commentators claim many recent laws have been the result of emotional 
public responses to violent crimes but are not based on logic or function.27 In 
short, these commentators describe recent legislative action as “feel good 
legislation,” which ignores possible adverse consequences and will not actually 
make a difference in the frequency of a particular crime.28  
Citing this lack of effectiveness, critics pose various possible adverse 
consequences and insist that they outweigh any benefit. One difficulty may lie 
in evaluating whether someone is genuinely in danger or the degree to which an 
easy rescue is possible, which may, in turn, result in unjust convictions.29 
Another consequence may arise from a vague statute that could allow 
prosecutors to bring frivolous charges and allow convictions to be based on the 
“public moral outrage.”30  
A separate criticism is that an affirmative duty to act may encourage 
reckless attempts to rescue victims of crime.31 Critics assert that this will only 
exacerbate the situation by putting the would-be-rescuer in just as much danger 
as the victim.32 Under this view, preventing crime is best left to law enforcement 
professionals.33  
Further concerns focus on potential adverse consequences for those 
providing assistance. A legal requirement to assist could result in personal 
consequences in the form of legal retribution for failing to comply with that duty, 
or injury from voluntarily engaging in a dangerous situation.34 It is difficult for 
some critics to accept the idea that there are individuals who should face 
consequences for their inaction.35 The general theme underlying these concerns 
 
23 Montana, supra note 17, at 536. 
24 Amelia J. Uelmen, Crime Spectators and the Tort of Objectification, 12 U. MASS. L. REV. 68, 76 
(2017). 
25 Justin T. King, Criminal Law: “Am I My Brother’s Keeper?” Sherrice’s Law: A Balance of 
American Notions of Duty and Liberty, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 613, 628 (1999). 
26 Stewart, supra note 17, at 428. 
27 Id. at 422. 
28 Id. 
29 Jay Logan Rogers, Testing the Waters for an Arizona Duty-to-Rescue Law, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 897, 
907 (2014). 
30 Id. at 910. 
31 Id. at 908–09.   
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 909.  
34 Andrew D. Kaplan, “Cash-Ing Out”: Regulating Omissions, Analysis of the Sherrice Iverson 
Act, 26 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 67, 82 (2000). 
35 Id. 
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is that bystander legislation diminishes free agency and that an individual should 
only be held accountable for their affirmative actions.36 
Scholars have also argued that “duty-to-assist laws ‘go beyond the 
appropriate realm of criminal liability and into the sphere of moral 
accountability.’”37 Under this view, an encouragement of altruistic behavior is 
the answer.38 Such scholars point to “the moral compass,” arguing that people 
in our society feel an obligation to help those in need, and that such behavior 
need not be legally mandated.39 Instead, the requirement to extend assistance to 
others should be forwarded by other social institutions, such as religion. This 
commentary asserts that the moral duty to assist will continue to be enforced by 
the potential reproach of “good people” in our society.40  
In contrast, other scholars take issue with the rigid nature of the law that 
prevents imposing liability on those who witness crime and do nothing.41 These 
commentators support bystander liability and make various arguments to 
forward their claims. One obvious argument is that such laws provide an 
incentive to help strangers in peril, which will prevent crime and protect 
victims.42 Further, some argue that duty to assist laws reflect the general views 
of our society.43  
For example, Marcia M. Ziegler urges legislatures around the country to 
create a uniform duty to assist law consistent with what society already considers 
reasonable.44 She asserts that the traditional rule eliminating liability for “failing 
to act” operates as an exception to the widespread duty to act as a reasonably 
prudent person would under the circumstances.45 That is, the lack of a duty to 
assist is essentially a “get out of jail free” pass that operates contrary to society’s 
collective sense of morality and logic.46 Ziegler proposes statutory language that 
would codify what society already considers reasonable to put unreasonable 
people on notice that their behavior is likely to result in liability.47 She argues 
that duty to assist statutes have the potential to prevent suffering and, at the very 
least, would create liability for those who are responsible.48  
Proponents of this view note that the law already imposes an affirmative 
duty to act in various situations, reflecting society’s views. Those duties are 
designed to prevent instances such as drunk driving deaths and child abuse and 
 
36 Id. at 71.  
37 Stewart, supra note 17, at 433.  
38 Id. at 432–33. 
39 Id.  
40 Id. 
41 Breanna Trombley, Criminal Law—No Stitches for Snitches: The Need for a Duty-to-Report Law 
in Arkansas, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 813, 815–16 (2012). 
42 Rogers, supra note 29, at 902. 
43 Id. at 903. 
44 Ziegler, supra note 17, at 556. 
45 Id. at 539. 
46 Id. at 555. 
47 Id. at 556. 
48 Id. at 559–60. 
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to make sure people enforce and respect pre-existing contractual agreements.49 
Essentially, the argument is that laws already exist and have evolved to impose 
duties to behave in a way that conforms to societal standards; therefore, no 
further legislative adjustments are required. 
Commentators also suggest that many of the adverse consequences posed 
by critics may be mitigated by the language of the statute. For example, most of 
the relevant statutes contain exceptions that apply in circumstances where 
assistance would cause danger for the person providing assistance or for third 
parties.50 Some also note that the duty imposed can be very narrow. One way to 
narrow the statute would be to explicitly state that it would apply only in 
situations where the bystander knows that a person is exposed to or has suffered 
grave physical harm.51  
Other ways in which bystander legislation can, and has, been limited is 
through language which specifies that the duty will be fulfilled by simply 
attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel, such as 
simply dialing 911.52 Language which narrows such legislation has also focused 
on created limits to the potential liability for those who violate the duty to assist. 
There are suggestions that bystander statutes should specifically limit the 
possible liability to low level offenses or the imposition of small fines.53 In other 
words, the idea is to create a statute that acts as “more of a nudge than a shove.”54 
IV.  BYSTANDER LEGISLATION INTERNATIONALLY AND IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Some states and several countries, despite their differing legal structures 
and historical backgrounds, have arrived at similar conclusions: that their society 
would benefit from the implementation of some form of bystander legislation. 
The American legal system traces its roots to the early seventeenth century, 
when English settlers brought the common law and practices of the English 
system.55 England has of yet, never codified a duty to assist, refusing to place a 
legal liability upon the failure to act.  
In writing the majority opinion for the House of Lords (comparable to an 
American Court of Appeals), Lord Hoffman addressed the types of duties that 
individuals, acting as members of society, owe to one another:  
One can put the matter in political, moral or economic terms. In 
political terms it is less of an invasion of an individual’s freedom for 
the law to require him to consider the safety of others in his actions 
 
49 Id. at 555. 
50 Rogers, supra note 29, at 918–19. 
51 Id. at 919. 
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 920. 
55 Selena E. Molina, The Roots of Our Legal System: The Foundation for Growth, A.B.A. (2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/tyl/topics/legal-history/roots-ou 
r-legal-system-foundation-growth/ [https://perma.cc/W3WS-8UL3]. 
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than to impose upon him a duty to rescue or protect. A moral version 
of this point may be called the ‘Why pick on me?’ argument.56 
The American judiciary chose to follow English precedence. Courts will 
only recognize that bystanders have certain duties: imposed legislatively; 
contractually; situations where parties have a special relationship to one another; 
or in instances where an individual creates a hazardous situation that places 
another individual in danger, which would place a duty to rescue upon the 
individual who created the hazard.57 
In 1898, New Hampshire’s Chief Justice of the Supreme Court articulated 
the common law standard with the following illustrative scenario: 
Suppose A., standing close by a railroad, sees a two-year-old babe on 
the track, and a car approaching. He can easily rescue the child, with 
entire safety to himself, and the instincts of humanity require him to 
do so. If he does not, he may, perhaps, justly be styled a ruthless 
savage and a moral monster; but he is not liable in damages for the 
child’s injury, or indictable under the statute for its death.58  
The Chief Justice was correct, and while the court of moral opinion might 
label a man who declines to save a child’s life as a “monster,” the “mere moral 
obligation” to act is outside the scope of traditional legally reprehensible civil or 
criminal behavior.59  
For decades, it remained true that “[n]o action will lie against a spiteful 
man, who, seeing another running into danger, merely omits to warn him.”60 
Then, in 1967, Vermont became the first state to pass bystander legislation, and 
other states shortly began to follow suit. In a little over three decades, ten states 
passed duty to assist laws. The strength and subject matter of these laws vary 
from state to state.  
 
 
56 Stovin v. Wise [1996] 3 All ER 801 (HL) 819 (appeal taken from Eng.).  
57 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 405 (2d ed. 
2011). 
58 Buch v. Armory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 810 (N.H. 1898). 
59 People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128, 1129 (Mich. 1907). 
60 Gautret v. Egerton, L.R. 2 C.P. 371, 375 (1867).  
2020 GUIORA & DYER: BYSTANDER LEGISLATION 303 
 
Figure 361 
Of the states that have imposed an affirmative duty upon bystanders, with 
no relation to the victim, only four have broad duty to assist laws that require 
action by any person at the scene of any emergency, regardless of the crime, or 
the victim.62 Vermont’s innovative legislation has some of the broadest statutory 
language: 
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical 
harm shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger 
or peril to himself or herself or without interference with important 
duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed 
person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others. 
(b) A person who provides reasonable assistance in compliance with 
subsection (a) of this section shall not be liable in civil damages unless 
his or her acts constitute gross negligence or unless he or she will 
receive or expects to receive remuneration. Nothing contained in this 
subsection shall alter existing law with respect to tort liability of a 
practitioner of the healing arts for acts committed in the ordinary 
course of his or her practice. 
(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall 
 
61 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (West 1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.69.100 (West 1970); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (West 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 1983); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West 1983); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 1984); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 794.027 (West 1984); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.6 (West 1984); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 11-56-1 (West 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 18 (West 1985); 11 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 11-1-5.1 (West 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3 (West 2000). 
62 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (West 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 1983); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 1984); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-56-1 (West 1984).  
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be fined not more than $100.00.63 
The six states with limited bystander legislation have statutory language 
that limits its application to either a specific category of victim or a specific type 
of crime.  
 
Figure 464 
Florida’s statute, for example, criminalizes only the failure to report sexual 
battery while remaining silent about those who choose to ignore victims facing 
any other form of peril.65 In 2017, a handicapped adult male drowned in Florida 
while a group of teens mocked him and filmed him on their cell phones; once 
the man stopped struggling and failed to resurface, the onlookers remarked “oh 
he just died” and departed the scene that was no longer entertaining, and 
uploaded the video to the internet, no doubt to gain some notoriety with a viral 
 
63 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (West 1967). 
64 See generally Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect, CHILDREN’S BUREAU (Apr. 
2019), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7CB-XDZV]; VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (West 1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.69.100 (West 1970); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (West 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 1983); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West 1983); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 794.027 (West 1984); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.6 (West 1984); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
§ 11-56-1 (West 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 18 (West 1985); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 11-1-5.1 (West 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3 (West 2000). 
65 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.027 (West 1984). 
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video.66 No Florida law was broken. 
In 1997, in Las Vegas, nineteen-year-old David Cash Jr. watched his friend 
sexually assault seven-year-old Sherrice Iverson in a public restroom.67 When 
Cash later asked his friend what happened to the child, his friend said he had 
killed her.68 Cash never reported the rape and murder of the child.69 Sherrice’s 
mother began a petition, asking authorities to hold Cash legally accountable for 
his inaction.70 The district attorney assigned to the case stated that, regrettably, 
she could not hold Cash accountable in a court of law; only the court of public 
opinion could render judgment.71 
Sherrice’s murder—and other acts of violence towards children—brings 
into question the capacity of safeguards that may or may not exist in each 
jurisdiction. Every state has created a list of professionals who are legally 
mandated to report the neglect or abuse of a child.72 States differ when it comes 
to which bystanders must act when they know that a child is being abused or 
neglected. Some legislation has language where others may report child abuse, 
and others where individuals must report child abuse.73 
  
 
66 Do You Have to Rescue Someone in Danger?, supra note 3; CBS Worldwide, Inc., The Bad 
Samaritan Part 1 of 2 (1998), YOUTUBE (Aug. 2, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KqTd 
XOQmXrc [https://perma. cc/EF46-E8PE]. 






72 Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 64, at 2. 
73 Id. 
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In each of the gray states, there is no legal requirement for an individual to 
report the neglect or abuse of a child if that individual has no identifiable 
relationship to that child.75 In other words, Cash would still face no legal 
consequences for his role in the murder of Sherrice Iverson in any of these states.  
Variations of legal requirements for bystanders to assist individuals in 
distress have been enacted in Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland, and Tunisia.76 
Legislation in each country differs in its construction as well as its 
application. One example is French Penal Code 223-6, which reads:   
Any person who willfully abstains from rendering assistance to a 
person in peril when he or she could have rendered that assistance 
without risk to himself, herself, or others, either by acting personally 
or by calling for aid, is liable to the same penalties [i.e., five years 
imprisonment and a 500,000 francs fine].77 
An example of bystander legislation application arose from an incident that 
took place in October 2016, when an eighty-three-year-old man collapsed at the 
 
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 See generally Criminal Codes, LEGISLATIONLINE, https://www.legislationline.org/documents/ 
section/criminal-codes/country/46/Albania/show [https://perma.cc/N92Q-7KTQ]. 
77 Edward A. Tomlinson, French Experience with Duty to Rescue: A Dubious Case for Criminal 
Enforcement, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 451, 460–61 (2000) (citing the 1994 French 
Penal Code [C. PÉN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 223-6 (Fr.)).  
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entryway of a bank in Germany and not one, not two, but three people stepped 
over the man to use the ATM.78 The incident was captured by a surveillance 
camera and was used in court to show the indifference bystanders showed 
towards the elderly man, who died a week after his collapse at the bank.79 The 
three bystanders were convicted and required to pay fines, ranging from $2,900 
to $4,300, for failing to assist the man, which was a direct violation of German 
law.80 By holding these individuals accountable for their callous indifference, 
Germany sent a message to all its citizens that they are held to a higher standard; 
if there is suffering and something can be done, something should be done. 
V.  APPLICATION OF BYSTANDER LEGISLATION 
Two contrasting criticisms of bystander legislation address its application: 
it will lead to a flood of litigation, and, if the crime is indeed difficult to prove, 
no one will be charged under the statute making its enactment a waste of time. 
The inherent complication with answering these types of questions is that there 
is no single system, nationally or at the state level, that can track how and when 
a certain piece of legislation is used. Therefore, in an attempt to address whether 
either of these criticisms have merit, we contacted approximately 450 
courthouses from the ten states that have such legislation. 
Less than half of these courthouses responded; approximately sixty percent 
of those who responded indicated that their system could not access the 
requested information.81 However, from the courthouses that could access the 
information, almost no instances were reported of individuals being charged 
under their state’s bystander legislation. The few instances where individuals 
were charged with failure to report indicates that the legislation has not proven 
useless while also affirming that, following its enactment, it did not lead to an 
untenable amount of litigation.  
We also used a broader method to analyze the frequency of legislation use 
by examining all reported cases on Lexis and Westlaw. The limitations with this 
method are that each site only lists those appellate cases which have been 
reported. The following information was gathered from the two websites:82  
 
 
78 Cassandra Santiago & Stephanie Halasz, Germany Convicts 3 for Not Helping an Elderly Man 




81 Survey Findings of Reported Appellate Cases Dealing with Criminal Charges based on “Duty to 
Report” Legislation (August 2019) (unpublished findings) (on file with authors at the S.J. Quinney 
College of Law, University of Utah) (using Westlaw and Lexis databases). 
82 Id. 
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Figure 6 
The scarce number of appellate cases may be an indication that the 
ramifications are so insignificant that individuals would rather not waste time 
and money to appeal, that there are not many prosecutions to begin with, or that 
the prosecutions under these laws are only undertaken when there is extremely 
solid evidence and high likelihood of conviction.  
The approaches that Courts have taken when addressing these cases are 
more crucial to understanding this type of legislation than the percentages of use 
or frequencies of litigation. Legislators have indicated that amongst their biggest 
concerns with bystander legislation is its application.83 The type of impact that 
legislation will have on a community is vitally important, and, for some 
legislators, it is the only factor worthy of consideration when discussing newly 
proposed bills.84 
In assessing the impact that a specific legislation has had, the traditional 
approach is to look at court cases and scholarly assessments. The application of 
duty to assist legislation has proved difficult to analyze for two reasons. First, 
 
83 Duty to Assist in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 125, supra note 4; 911 Responsibilities in an 
Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 170, supra note 4. 
84 Duty to Assist in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 125, supra note 4; 911 Responsibilities in an 
Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 170, supra note 4. 
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there are only ten states with duty to assist legislation, with varying degrees of 
coverage, and many have only been on the books for a few decades;85 therefore, 
case law is limited on this subject. Secondly, due to the lack of cases available 
to analyze, most scholarly works can only address the subject from a theoretical 
perspective.  
Specific applications of these statutes by courts has proven to be the best 
indicator of their real-world effect. Misinterpretation of these statutes often has 
individuals imagining that it requires direct intervention of bystanders.86 The 
Supreme Court of Vermont specifically indicated that their duty to assist “does 
not create a duty to intervene in a fight.”87 If the situation presents “danger or 
peril” to the rescuer, then Vermont’s statute prevents a duty from arising.88 
In Washington, the attempt to elevate the failure to report a violent offense 
to support a manslaughter charge was rejected by the State Supreme Court.89 
Such legislation was used to increase criminal charges in Hawaii after two-year-
old Natasha was beaten and then later succumbed to her wounds because neither 
her mother, nor her mother’s boyfriend, sought medical assistance.90 The 
circumstances surrounding Natasha’s death made it difficult to tie a specific 
individual to her injuries as the defendants claimed that several individuals had 
access to, and could have beaten, the child on the day that she died.91 Unable to 
tie Natasha’s injuries to an individual’s affirmative actions, the court held that 
the mother and boyfriend, who knew of the child’s condition and failed to obtain 
medical care, recklessly caused the child’s death.92 
In every state, parents are statutorily bound to protect their children and 
seek medical attention when necessary;93 however, the mother’s boyfriend had 
no legal connection to the child. Absent additional statutory requirements, the 
boyfriend would have gone free, despite proof he knew the child was in critical 
condition and evidence to suggest that he likely had a hand in inflicting those 
injuries. Hawaii passed legislation twenty years prior to the incident which 
provides that “[a]ny person at the scene of a crime who knows that a victim of 
the crime is suffering from serious physical harm shall obtain or attempt to 
obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel.”94 The boyfriend’s 
 
85 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (West 1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.69.100 (West 1970); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (West 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 1983); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West 1983); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 1984); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 794.027 (West 1984); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.6 (West 1984); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 11-56-1 (West 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 18 (West 1985); 11 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 11-1-5.1 (West 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3 (West 2000). 
86 Duty to Assist in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 125, supra note 4; 911 Responsibilities in an 
Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 170, supra note 4. 
87 State v. Joyce, 433 A.2d 271, 273 (Vt. 1981). 
88 Id. 
89 State v. Sublett, 292 P.3d 715, 728 (Wash. 2012). 
90 State v. Faufata, 66 P.3d 785, 793–94 (Haw. Ct. App. 2003). 
91 Id. at 793.  
92 Id. at 796–97. 
93 Baruch Gitlin, Annotation, Parents’ Criminal Liability for Failure To Provide Medical Attention 
to Their Children, 118 A.L.R. 5th 253 (2004). 
94 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.6 (West 1984). 
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attempt to escape liability failed and, despite his sentence being lessened due to 
an absence of evidence of criminal commissions, was punished for his criminal 
commissions.95 
Given the importance of the effect that legislation has on a community, it 
is critical to include in the discussion any instances where similar laws have been 
enforced in other jurisdictions before passing new laws. These discussions 
themselves often help courts determine the manner in which a statute should be 
interpreted because, if there is uncertainty as to a statute’s meaning, justices may 
look to “the legislative history of the measures and statements” by those who 
were in charge of the statute during its consideration.96 Careful craftmanship and 
thoughtful conversation is perhaps the singularly best way to ensure that new 
legislation is used exclusively in situations for which it was designed. 
VI.  OUR EXPERIENCES WITH THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE STATE OF 
UTAH 
While the Utah Legislature has yet to ratify State Rep. King’s “911 
Responsibilities in an Emergency” legislation,97 our experiences shed invaluable 
light on the complexity of the legislative process with matters that intersect 
morality and legality. It is that complicated space that the question of bystander 
duty occupies; there is a sense of “cross-over” that casts doubt for some 
legislators on the viability of legislating what some refer to as “the right thing to 
do.” While other arguments were voiced in opposition to the proposed 
legislation, it is this question—more than any other—that raises the greatest 
concern for legislators. The question is “why?”, and what do we learn from that? 
In focusing on the morality-legality confluence, it seems that a preliminary 
question that is glossed over, yet deserves our utmost attention since it is the 
core of the proposal, is how to frame the duty owed by person A to person B 
when there is no pre-existing relationship or otherwise legislated duty. This 
requires the creation of a duty between two individuals who do not know each 
other, when the person in peril is neither a child nor elderly. This caveat is 
relevant because in Utah, duty laws were enacted by the legislature applying to 
vulnerable children and the elderly.98 
State Rep. King’s legislation can be perceived as an “add-on” to duty 
requirements that the Legislature previously codified. It is that “extra step”—
extending existing obligations—that has proven particularly vexing. State Rep. 
King’s legislation would extend the existing duty requirement—a seemingly 
logical measure—to a category not presently defined as vulnerable: individuals 
in peril, incapable of the simple act of dialing 911, as that is the sole obligation 
State Rep. King’s legislation imposes on the bystander.  
The victim—presently outside existing protected categories of children or 
the elderly—has no special characteristics and no connection to the person 
 
95 State v. Martinez, 68 P.3d 606, 612, 617 (Haw. 2003). 
96 United States v. Great N. Ry. Co., 287 U.S. 144, 154 (1932). 
97 H.B. 170, 2019 Leg., 63d Sess. (Utah 2019). 
98 UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-3-305 (West 2012).  
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positioned to provide the minimal assistance to alleviate the peril. In other 
words, there is neither a pre-existing duty nor a pre-existing relationship between 
the victim and the person positioned to alleviate distress. The intent of State Rep. 
King’s legislation to protect falls into a space outside specially designated and 
protected zones. It is that category, devoid of special characteristics and unique 
qualities, that—as we learned over the past two years during meetings, 
discussions, and hearings—has proved the most challenging for legislators to 
recognize as also being vulnerable and in need of assistance when in peril. That, 
for lack of a better term, “middle category,” if not in peril at a particular moment 
would not require assistance is one that the legislature has proved unwilling to 
impose as a requirement on the bystander to intervene on their behalf when 
circumstances clearly dictate “help needed.”  
While legislators acknowledge there are instances when individuals in 
distress require assistance, they reference the “right thing to do” argument, 
reflecting a conclusion that the bystander will be sufficiently morally 
grounded.99 It is an argument, actually a refrain, that seemingly “soothes the 
soul” of the speaker, reflecting a belief in the basic goodness of humanity, and 
assuming that victims in peril can rely on this model. Similarly, those that 
ascribe to this school of thought reject the notion of punishment and deterrence; 
after all, if the requirement is perceived solely through the lens of morality, then 
there are no consequences or accountability for failure to act. The failure to adopt 
a mechanism whereby the bystander who fails to intervene is punished for doing 
so fails both the immediate victim and future victims.  
The resistance from a majority of Utah legislators over the past two years 
requires us to address the following question: who is deserving of protection? If 
it is the victim, then the most obvious way to do so is to impose a legal 
requirement with criminal penalty; if it is the bystander, then failure to ratify 
State Rep. King’s legislation ensures adoption of a bystander protection model. 
It is unclear why members of the Legislature would prefer protecting the able 
rather than extending protection to the vulnerable.  
In the context of the “duty” question, the legislature has clearly laid down 
its marker: the “moral” bystander will “know what to do,” and if that does not 
occur, then the victim will not be relieved of peril and there will be no 
consequences for walking away. Consequently, the Utah legislature has signaled 
that failing to provide assistance will be consequence free and the victim will be 
left to their own devices. In other words, legislators extend protection to the 
individual who fails to act on behalf of another member of society who needs 
assistance. This seems to be a sense of duty turned on its head: should not the 
primary focus of the Legislature be to extend protections to the weak, rather than 
the strong? After all, “in the moment,” it is the victim who is weak and the 
bystander who is “strong.” 
In the debate before the House Judiciary Committee on January 21, 2018, 
one State Representative focused on the idea that this legislation was a “180-
 
99 Duty to Assist in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 125, supra note 4; 911 Responsibilities in an 
Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 170, supra note 4. 
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degree turn” from a legal standard that potentially has been in place “since the 
beginning of time,”100 and framed the issue in the following manner: 
So, my question is, what is the compelling policy argument for 
changing a law that has essentially existed forever? You had suggested 
maybe so that we could mitigate the likelihood of crime or loss of life, 
but we’re becoming a safer, less violent, nation all the time, it seems 
those arguments would fit more 100 years ago, or 200 years ago, or 
back in old England, in places and times when people were literally 
dying in the street and others walked by. We didn’t do it then; we’ve 
resisted it until now.101 
Another State Representative echoed similar concerns: 
The challenge we have as legislators, as lawmakers, is do we take the 
moral imperative that most of us feel and now do we make it a legal 
imperative that has legal consequences? I’m not arguing with you 
about the fact that it is good, and it is the right thing, but we also try to 
be careful, and we recognize that words have meaning, and we also 
recognize as we sit here, that it’s very difficult to anticipate all of the 
consequences as a result of passage.102 
This same State Representative also voiced concern over the type and weight of 
the liability that such legislation may present: “I do believe it also does set a 
standard, because we’re saying to the people of the state, ‘if you fail to act in 
these situations, you’re criminally liable.’ Well clearly if I’m criminally liable I 
have a civil duty as well.”103 
During the House floor debate on February 19, 2019, a third State 
Representative made a similar argument, delving into the second issue, which 
has been a significant source of concern for some legislators, and criminalizing 
the failure to act thereby legislating a “crime of omission”: 
Traditionally under criminal law, as the prior representative noted, the 
criminal law requires a criminal act, and criminal intent. Here we are 
criminalizing doing nothing, we are criminalizing inaction. Now 
references made to our current law where we have a duty to report 
abuse of children or abuse of the elderly, we make those exceptions in 
the law because of the distinct and unique vulnerability of children and 
elderly. This law, this bill rather, would open up that liability to society 
at large, to everyone, not just children and elderly but anyone who is 
in distress. And we impose a duty to report. That is a big leap, it is a 
 
100 Duty to Assist in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 125, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. Brian 
Greene, Member, H. Judiciary Comm.). 
101 Id. 
102 Duty to Assist in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 125, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. Lowry 
Snow, Member, H. Judiciary Comm.).  
103 Id. 
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big leap for us to take in our law.104  
The State Representative then referenced the murder of Sherrice Iverson 
and how it piqued his interest concerning Cash’s liability under Utah law: 
I did locate under Utah law, under existing law, section 76-2-202. It is 
our accomplice liability statute it says that anyone who “intentionally 
aids another person to engage in a crime can also be criminally liable 
for that crime.” Intentionally aids, the case law in Utah, I read a few 
of the cases, how is that interpreted, aiding [sic] you’re considered to 
aid in a crime, if you stand by and do nothing. And so, for example, in 
the case of State v. Cheney, a man was held liable under the 
accomplice liability statute for allowing his child to be raped. In the 
case of State v. Beltran-Felix, it was a case of a sexual assault where 
two men entered into a store, one of the men raped one of the women 
who was there while the other friend watched, or waited, allowing the 
crime to occur without intervention, and the observing friend was held 
liable for aiding his friend in the commission of a crime.105  
While voicing his concern that criminalizing acts of omission would be a 
drastic departure from current legislature, the State Representative 
simultaneously made the argument that current Utah law does just that: “We 
have an existing law that allows those who do nothing in these situations where 
a crime is being occurred, where someone is in need, we allow them to be 
prosecuted as an accomplice.”106 
After expressing that he appreciated the idea of sending a message that 
everyone should step up and be good Samaritans, one State Representative on 
the Floor Debate in February 2018 commented as follows: 
I don’t like the idea of legislating goodness. I think it’s been mentioned 
before but the good people of Utah do reach out and I don’t see that 
there’s a problem. Maybe it’ll require a few more, maybe we’ll get a 
few more reports, but I worry more about the chilling effect that it 
might have.107  
Along with other opponents to the bill, this State Representative was 
apprehensive about deviating from the status quo: 
. . . it’s just such a departure from our criminal code and our law, 
without any mens rea or action on your part, you can become a 
criminal by your inaction. While I recognize the need for vulnerable 
adults and our youth, I don’t think we should take it to the extent that 
 
104 911 Responsibilities in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 170, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. 
Merrill Nelson).  
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Duty to Assist in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 125, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. Kelly 
Miles). 
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this law does.108 
What these four Representatives articulated—in the 2018 and 2019 
Committee and Floor debates—highlights the principled reservations with the 
legislation. In a nutshell, the four State Representatives are expressing two 
separate but perhaps related concerns: imposing a legal duty to act on behalf of 
the bystander and penalizing the crime of omission. These issues—whether 
viewed separately or jointly—present the most compelling reason to vote against 
the legislation.  
These concerns were oft-heard refrains when State Rep. King and the 
authors met with members of the Utah legislature; in some ways, it became a 
mantra for those opposing the proposed legislation. The question is what the 
source of this concern is and how best to overcome it.  
Extending the “duty to act” necessarily focuses on the consequences of 
imposing a relationship between individuals where, otherwise, none exists. This 
is distinct from the relationship between an individual and the state in which the 
“duty” question is predicated on a contractual relationship. The discomfort 
expressed regarding the temporary-transient-fleeting relationship State Rep. 
King recommends focuses on the risks in creating an obligation between two 
individuals where one would not, otherwise, exist.  
The Members of the Legislature prefer this duty be contained to a morality-
moral “boundary” rather than extension to the terrain of the law. That is, though 
recognizing that the person in distress would benefit from bystander 
intervention, criminalizing the failure or omission reflects government over-step 
in demanding particular actions. This argument is, frankly, bystander-focused 
rather than victim-centered.  
That is the essence of the disagreement, highlighting distinct means of 
addressing the existential question of duty. By limiting it to an inquiry of moral 
values, framed in the traditional “we know to do the right thing,” we are leaving 
an individual in peril to the good graces of another. In the inherently limited 
paradigm, should the bystander not intervene—limited to “dialing 911”—then 
there are three, if not four, results: no assistance to a victim, no punishment to 
the bystander for failing to provide assistance, and no deterrence to future 
bystanders, thereby arguably failing to provide assistance to future victims. 
From the perspective of present and future victims, this suggests a profound 
failure in their hour of need. It is, more than anything, abandonment 
compounded by a knowing, and deliberate, determination not to punish the 
bystander positioned to act. 
While one assumes those legislators do not wish ill on the victim, the 
practical result of their opposition leads to that very result, whether intended or 
not. The hesitation to and recoil from legislating a crime of omission has the 
same consequence from the victim’s perspective. More than that, criminal codes, 
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punishment for failing to stop at a stop sign and failure to pay taxes. In both 
situations, the legislature determined that the act of omission is punishable in a 
court of law. 
Thus, the question is why these four State Representatives find creating a 
crime of omission so objectionable when the sole purpose of State Rep. King’s 
legislation is to minimize harm to a vulnerable member of society. After all, that 
is the underlying basis for the proposal. Crimes of omission are intended to 
punish for a failure; is not walking away from a person in peril a failure? Therein 
appears the crux of the dilemma: what State Rep. King frames as a criminal 
failure, his peers perceive a moral failing. The division is profound; one suggests 
tolerating abandoning the victim, and the other would impose a criminal penalty. 
These, then, are two distinct approaches to the age old saying, “am I my 
Brother’s keeper”:109 who do we protect and what are the consequences of 
failing to create an accountability-predicated mechanism whereby minimal 
intervention is required, and omission is criminalized. The concerns articulated 
by the four State Representatives suggest that protection is to be extended to the 
bystander; the proposal introduced by State Rep. King proposes protecting the 
victim.  
These are two distinct approaches to a critical societal question that 
intersects distinct disciplines. The morality-based approach extends protection 
to the non-intervening bystander; the legal based approach criminalizes that non-
intervention. From the perspective of the victim—the person most in need of 
assistance—the failure to impose a requirement to intervene escalates the peril 
which, frankly, would seem to be the very antithesis of how the parable is 
intended to be answered. 
VII.  WHY IS BYSTANDER LEGISLATION A BAD IDEA? 
After listening to Utah legislators and cataloging other discussions of 
bystander legislation, the most frequent criticisms are summarized below. 
A.  Prosecutorial Discretion 
Prosecutors are given a generous amount of discretion when it comes to 
deciding whether to prosecute. It has been well established that so long as a 
prosecutor does not base their decision to prosecute on an impermissible factor 
then there is no violation of due process.110 
Although a prosecutor obviously cannot base charging decisions on a 
defendant’s race, sex, religion, or exercise of a statutory or 
constitutional right, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to 
believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the 
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file . . . 
 
109 Genesis 4:9. 
110 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); see 
also United States v. Andersen, 940 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Morehead, 
959 F.2d 1489, 1499 (10th Cir. 1992). 
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generally rests entirely in his discretion.111 
When facing criminal charges, it justifiably makes a defendant uneasy that 
their case largely rests with an individual who can decide to bring charges based 
upon numerous factors. The system allows prosecutors to operate without 
judicial interference and narrows the review of a prosecutor’s exercise of 
discretion in scope.112  
Concern over prosecutorial misconduct has risen over the past few decades; 
however, this is not likely due to a rise in increasing prosecutorial misconduct 
and more likely the result of increasing media coverage of it.113 The increasing 
concern of prosecutorial misconduct has been met with a shift in regulations that 
are aimed towards great legal and political accountability for prosecutors.114 
Prosecutors already must “consider three sets of reasons to decline or 
pursue charges: legal reasons, administrative reasons, and equitable reasons.” 115 
When gathering data from the ten states that have some form of bystander 
legislation, there was no evidence that crimes which arose under these statutes 
were being routinely prosecuted. This may be because factual findings to support 
that an individual willfully declined to assist an individual in crisis are difficult 
to establish.  
The prosecutor’s office likely thinks that a successful prosecutor is one who 
“works quickly, disposing of as many cases as possible through plea 
bargains.”116 The criminal penalty in most states for failure to assist only 
amounts to a misdemeanor, and, absent a clear path to conviction, it would 
appear that prosecutors are more inclined to quickly move on to more pressing 
matters. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has stated that prosecutors have a 
duty to examine each matter with “care and accuracy.”117 Prosecutors must keep 
in mind the relative importance to their community when determining which 
cases to prosecute, while also weighing the chances of success.118 It simply is 
not feasible for prosecutors to prosecute every matter brought before them. 
Failure to assist cases are unlikely to be prioritized by prosecutors unless they 
are confident they can establish every criminal element, which is difficult to do 
under such statutes, or if it is a matter of high importance to the community.  
 
111 United States v. Curtis, 344 F.3d 1057, 1064 (10th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
112 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., CRIMINAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3513 (3d ed. 2019) (citing 
United States v. Smith, 354 A.2d 510, 513 (D.C. 1976)). 
113 Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
51, 87 (2016). 
114 Id. at 53. 
115 Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1655 (2010). 
116 Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 
PENN ST. L. REV. 1133, 1136 (2005). 
117 State v. Winne, 96 A.2d 63, 73 (N.J. 1953). 
118 Id.  
2020 GUIORA & DYER: BYSTANDER LEGISLATION 317 
B.  Legislating Morality 
When attempting to pass bystander legislation through Utah’s legislature, 
the notion that this is simply an attempt to legislate morality was commonly 
voiced by state representatives.119 This is not a new concern and has been stated 
many times in various ways: 
It is, indeed, most highly desirable that [people] should not merely 
abstain from doing harm to their neighbors, but should render active 
services to their neighbors. In general however the penal law must 
content itself with keeping [individuals] from doing positive harm, and 
must leave to public opinion, and to the teachers of morality and 
religion, the office of furnishing [people] with motives for doing 
positive good.120 
While some balk at the idea of legislating morality, it should not be 
forgotten that, for the first century following the establishment of the United 
States, courts consistently upheld moral legislation against constitutional 
challenges.121 Even in recent years, congressional legislation has been upheld by 
the U.S. Supreme Court primarily for the moral implications of the bill.122 When 
thinking of the origins of any legislation, it seems difficult to imagine that any 
were created without referencing some moral code. A precise definition of 
morality is difficult; however, in determining whether morality is a legitimate 
government interest, one scholar defined it as “a set of normative principles 
about: (1) how humans should properly conduct themselves; and (2) how 
humans should treat one another, whether acting singularly or in the 
aggregate.”123 
Compare this to Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “law” as: “[t]he 
regime that orders human activities and relations through systematic application 
of the force of politically organized society, or through social pressure, backed 
by force, in such a society; the legal system.”124 
The overlap between morality and law is unmistakable. Law does have 
added pressures and is backed by force, but it seems a reasonable assumption 
that law is derived from moral considerations. If all proposed changes to 
legislation were met with the question—“isn’t this just legislating morality?”—
it would greatly hamper a legislative process, which is already oft complained 
of as being too slow. This criticism should rightly be ignored so that the merits 
of the proposed legislative changes have time to be thoroughly discussed and 
 
119 Duty to Assist in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 125, supra note 4; 911 Responsibilities in an 
Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 170, supra note 4. 
120 THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, A PENAL CODE PREPARED BY THE INDIAN LAW 
COMMISSIONERS 105 (1838). 
121 Daniel F. Piar, Morality as a Legitimate Government Interest, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 139, 139 
(2012). 
122 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 130 (2007) (upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban 
Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West 2003)). 
123 Piar, supra note 121, at 141. 
124 Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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vetted before being approved or rejected.  
C.  Creation of a “Nanny State” 
“Nanny state” is a pejorative term referring to “a government that 
overregulates its citizens by interfering with individual choice.”125 The term has 
been used to describe Michael Bloomberg’s mayoral efforts to increase healthy 
standards of living through restricting the sale of large soft drinks along with 
regulating sodium and trans fats.126  
While nanny state is typically used as a criticism, the term does not 
necessarily connote an adverse system. Regulations are meant to reduce the 
negative impact of “externalities,” or more plainly: “if those imposing costs on 
others are forced to pay for these costs, society will get the socially optimal 
amount of the activity generating the costs.”127 The troublesome version appears 
where regulators create legislation that is meant to improve the life of an 
individual while disregarding any costs others may experience.128 This type of 
regulation has been described as “the interference . . . with another person, 
against their will, and justified by a claim that the person interfered with will be 
better off.”129 
D.  Extra Burden on Emergency Service Personnel 
An inordinate burden on emergency services has been raised as a potential 
unintended side effect to bystander legislation. This may be an issue that cannot 
be addressed as a whole as each jurisdiction and municipality has different 
resources available to provide such public necessities.  
During the process of attempting to pass bystander legislation in Utah, an 
active fire fighter and president of the Professional Fire Fighters of Utah—an 
organization comprised of firefighters throughout the state—testified in favor of 
the legislation.130 He acknowledged that it would mean an increase in calls, but 
that firefighters are not afraid of work.131 Testifying as a firefighter who, from 
his estimations, goes on thousands of emergency calls a year, he stated that there 
were numerous times he had arrived at a scene only to wish that 911 had been 
called sooner.132  
Each city, county, and state must look at the adequacy of their emergency 
systems. This should be done regardless of bystander legislation. Advancements 
in technology will only make responding to emergency calls more efficient and 
 
125 Nanny State, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
126 Karen Harned, The Michael Bloomberg Nanny State in New York: A Cautionary Tale, FORBES 
(May 10, 2013, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/05/10/the-michael-bloom 
berg-nanny-state-in-new-york-a-cautionary-tale/#4cc7c5f07109 [https://perma.cc/Q28K-UUFC]. 
127 M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1517, 1522–23 (2009). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Duty to Assist in an Emergency: Hearing on H.B. 125, supra note 4 (statement of Jack Tidrow). 
131 Id. 
132 Id.  
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ease the burdens that individuals who deal with emergency situations face every 
day.  
The best way to determine the potential effects that bystander legislation 
may have on emergency service personnel would be to ascertain whether there 
was a negative impact on the ten states previously mentioned after they enacted 
such legislation. Differing forms of bystander legislation have been passed since 
1967, and there has been no data to suggest that those who provide emergency 
services have experienced any adverse impacts.  
E.  Creates the Possibility of Extra Criminal Liability 
Many criminal statutes consider as a general rule that “a person is guilty of 
involuntary manslaughter when as a direct result of the doing of an unlawful act 
in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the doing of a lawful act in a 
reckless or grossly negligent manner, he causes the death of another person.”133  
If there is a legally required duty to assist, then it could become an 
“unlawful act” not to assist. Further, if someone were to die due to a person’s 
inaction, that person could be guilty of involuntary manslaughter.  
Those already hesitant about creating criminal liability for inaction become 
much more prone to objection at the idea that such a law could be used as a basis 
for heightening criminal liability. Concern over heightened criminal liability has 
not gone unnoticed by legislators. In 2019, State Rep. King introduced duty to 
assist legislation that addressed this concern. The language in State Rep. King’s 
proposed bill was as follows: “[n]otwithstanding any contrary provision of state 
law, a prosecutor may not use an individual’s violation of Subsection (2) as the 
basis for charging the individual with another offense.”134 
This language unequivocally abolishes any fear that an individual will be 
charged with a secondary crime based upon their violation of State Rep. King’s 
proposed duty to assist bill.  
F.  Creates the Possibility of Civil Liability  
Some are concerned that the civil liability attached to bystander legislation 
is too great to justify any potential benefits. Legislators can easily dispel this 
concern by including a provision that reads something akin to the following: 
“nothing contained in this section shall alter existing law with respect to civil 
liability.” Whether the concerns are so great that legislators feel the need to 
include such a provision is a discretionary decision.  
Absent a provision exculpating an individual from civil liability, there are 
still barriers towards bringing a civil action based upon bystander legislation. In 
Wisconsin, a case was tried where the parents of a sixteen-year-old, whose life 
was tragically cut short, attempted to bring a wrongful death suit with its basis 
in the state’s bystander legislation.135 The complaint alleged the defendant’s 
 
133 E.g., 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504(a) (West 1995). 
134 H.B. 170, 2019 Leg., 63d Sess. (Utah 2019). 
135 Logarta v. Gustafson, 998 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (E.D. Wis. 1998). 
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inaction negligently led to their son’s death.136 The claim was dismissed because 
the plaintiffs were unable to establish that the defendant’s inactions were the 
proximate cause of their son’s death.137 
Bringing a civil suit based upon bystander legislation requires the plaintiff 
to show that, if the defendant had acted, then the injury or alleged damages 
would not have occurred or would have been lessened. Bystander legislation 
applies to individuals that had nothing to do with an individual’s original source 
of peril. The obligation to assist or call for help only is triggered once an 
individual is already suffering a serious physical injury that the bystander did 
not contribute to in any way. Proving in civil litigation that “but for” the 
bystander’s inactions the injury could not have taken place or was causally 
aggravated by those inactions is a difficult burden to meet. Every civil suit listed 
on Lexis or Westlaw that is predicated upon bystander legislation failed because 
of the inability to establish that the bystander proximately caused or aggravated 
any damages.138 
Civil suits based on duty to assist legislation have proven difficult for their 
proponents; however, the possibility of them being brought at all remains a 
concern for some. State Rep. King attempted to allay all fears of civil liability 
with language in his proposed bill: 
This section does not create an independent basis for civil liability for 
failure to provide the assistance described in this section. The fact that 
an individual is charged with a crime under this section may not be 
used to establish that the individual violated a duty on which a claim 
for personal injuries may be based.139 
G.  Distrust of Law Enforcement 
Research suggests that fear of police involvement is among the top reasons 
that individuals do not call or delay calling for help in an emergency.140 This is 
particularly common in situations that involve drug overdoses.141 In an attempt 
to encourage individuals to call 911, forty states (as of July 25, 2017) have 
passed laws that provide protection from prosecution for certain drug offenses 
for both the person calling for medical assistance and the person who has 
overdosed.142  
Fear of law enforcement is also very real in minority communities. 
According to the American Psychological Association (APA), “the probability 
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of being black, unarmed and shot by police is about 3.5 times the probability of 
being white, unarmed and shot by police.”143 The APA states that “[r]educing 
and circumventing bias is one way to chip away at the disparities in how police 
treat black civilians.”144 There are many ways to approach racially disparate 
treatment by law enforcement, but it is a systematic problem that will take years, 
if not decades, to solve. There is no evidence to suggest that the passage of duty 
to assist legislation will have a positive or negative effect on the issues that 
minorities face when it comes to law enforcement. 
Human Rights Watch, an international, non-governmental organization, 
stated that public safety is undermined because immigrant communities in the 
United States are afraid of calling law enforcement.145 Crimes, like rape, go 
unreported because victims fear that calling law enforcement will result in their 
deportation.146 Individuals at the Human Rights Watch suggest that this problem 
is difficult to fix on a community or state level and the best way to combat this 
problem is for the U.S. Congress to pass comprehensive immigration reform.147 
There are also those with family members who are mentally ill that resist 
calling law enforcement out of fear that it may turn into a deadly encounter.148 
In 2017, a mother in Brooklyn called 911 when her thirty-two-year-old son with 
schizophrenia was acting erratically.149 Police were unable to calm the man and 
opened fire after he lunged at them with a knife.150 Calling 911 to report 
emotionally disturbed individuals has often resulted in the problem escalating.151 
Efforts in New York City, and other cities alike, have been made so that officers 
receive crisis intervention training and have attempted to deploy more teams to 
calls involving the mentally ill that consist of a cop and a social worker.152 
While there may be those who have a justified fear of calling 911, this 
should not bar the implementation of duty to assist legislation. State Rep. King’s 
proposed bill, along with other duty to assist bills already in place, does not 
require an individual to remain at the scene after calling 911.  
H.  Aiding and Abetting Laws  
States have differing versions of aiding and abetting laws, but the purpose 
of these statutes is to hold an individual liable for another’s actions. Assisting 
another individual to commit a criminal act is in itself criminal and makes the 
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assistor an accomplice to that act. Accomplice liability is a basic principle of 
criminal law which can be misinterpreted and is easier to understand when 
broken down into its separate elements: 
Proof of aider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct 
areas: (1) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus, or a crime committed by 
direct perpetrator; (2) the aider and abettor’s mens rea, or knowledge 
of direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and intent to assist in achieving 
those unlawful ends; and (3) the aider and abettor’s actus reus, or 
conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists achievement of 
crime.153 
Utah’s law concerning criminal responsibility for direct commission of 
offense or for conduct of another reads as the following: “[e]very person, acting 
with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly 
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an 
offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.”154 
This language has been misconstrued by some who believe it should be 
interpreted as holding individuals accountable for acts and situations that 
bystander legislation is said to cover.155 Under this current legislation there 
would be no liability for David Cash, who consciously decided not to report the 
rape and murder of seven-year-old Sherrice Iverson. The District Attorney in 
that case explained that to charge Cash with aiding and abetting, “we would have 
to have evidence that Cash actually did something . . . with the thought and intent 
of helping Strohmeyer.”156 
Aiding and abetting statutes do not hold individuals responsible for 
choosing to do nothing after witnessing a crime or seeing someone in distress. 
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, “[i]n order to aid and abet another to 
commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant ‘in some sort associate himself 
with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring 
about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed.’”157 
Bystander legislation bridges the gap between instances where individuals 
act in concert together to commit a crime and those where an individual simply 
chooses not to summon assistance for someone they know is suffering a serious 
bodily injury. It is the difference between active criminal intent and callous 
indifference for the life of another human being.  
 
153 17 CAL. JUR. 3D CRIMINAL LAW: CORE ASPECTS § 148 (2019). 
154 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (West 1973).  
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VIII.  GOING FORWARD 
The issue we have addressed in this article is amongst the most important 
confronting an increasingly divisive, divided, and distant culture. The notion of 
compromise, reconciliation, and efforts to understand the “other” are archaic. In 
this atmosphere, the notion of “doing the right thing” is quainter than ever. That 
aspirational moral code is just that, an aspirational model code. Perhaps in a 
different era, not marked by the tone and tenor of today’s interaction, such an 
ideal might have “held water.” 
It harkens, seemingly, to a simpler day, recalling a 1950’s “father knows 
best” environment. While the nostalgia is admirable, if not understandable, it is 
of no benefit to the victim in need of assistance. That, ultimately, is the reason 
we propose imposing a legal obligation on the bystander. 
The proposed obligation on the bystander is minimal: just dial 911. The 
obligation is imposed only when the victim has knowledge of bystander peril 
and has the capability to act; furthermore, the burden is mitigated if acting 
endangers the bystander. From a cost-benefit perspective, the burden on the 
bystander is minimal whereas the benefit to the victim is significant. While we 
are sensitive to the arguments opposing the proposal, particularly the notion of 
“legislating morality,” we are of the belief that the discomfort, however valid, 
fails to recognize the primacy of the victim’s needs.  
The notion that imposing a legal duty on the bystander to dial 911 is akin 
to “legislating morality” reflects two distinct approaches to the core question of 
“to whom-what is a duty owed.” In recommending the imposition of criminal 
penalty on the bystander, we are of the opinion that a duty to fully reflect 
society’s recognition that a victim in peril requires assistance must be codified 
in the criminal code.  
Otherwise, it is not a duty but rather an amorphous concept, lacking weight 
and substance. If not codified in the criminal code, there is no penalty for failing 
to provide minimal assistance to the victim, thereby freeing the bystander of any 
consequence or accountability. From the victim’s perspective, that is akin to 
abandonment in the greatest hour of need. As history repeatedly demonstrates, 
“consequence free” abandonment is the norm when examining the “interaction” 
between victim and bystander. 
It is that recurring pattern that our proposal seeks to tackle. While the 
proposed penalty (in Utah) is modest—a Class B Misdemeanor with a penalty 
of $1,000 and/or six months incarceration—imposing a legal duty is, from the 
victim’s perspective, most significant. It is not an exaggeration to suggest it may 
well be the difference between life and death. At the very least, it is the 
difference between assistance in a time of peril and abandonment in a time of 
peril. This is not a matter of “legislating morality,” but rather of imposing an 
important legal duty on a person capable of assisting a person in peril. 
However, a criminal code in and of itself is insufficient; undertaking a 
significant educational effort is essential. Such an effort must be broad in scope 
and ambitious in its goals. Devoid of such a determined focus, the legislation 
will not carry its intended weight and will not have the desired impact. Re-stated, 
324 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y Vol. XXIX:2 
bystander legislation, to have the greatest impact, must be inculcated and 
embedded into the core of society in a systematic and institutionalized manner. 
This, then, is a “two-front” undertaking: law and education.  
Our focus on the law and education is distinct from the voices of opposition 
who rely on morality and basic human goodness. Because the argument is 
compelling, it understandably resonates in many quarters. However, the 
argument falls short when considered from the victim’s, rather than the 
bystander’s, perspective. Framing the argument in this context—victim or 
bystander—clarifies the dilemma confronting society, both practically and 
existentially: to whom is a duty owed. That, more than anything, defines the 
question of bystander obligation. 
In framing the query as legal—not moral—the path we recommend moving 
forward is clear. The most appropriate manner to ensure consequences for failing 
to provide assistance to the person in peril is imposition of criminal penalty. To 
rely on the “hopeful”—for that is the essence of a moral based approach—is to 
fail the victim in the most critical hour of need. As both the pages of history and 
contemporary accounts unequivocally demonstrate, victim reliance on the 
“rightness-goodness” of the bystander is a misbegotten fallacy. Reversing 
course, and on behalf of future victims, adopting a twin-track approach of 
legislation and education is the most effective mechanism for providing 
assistance to a human being in peril.  
Final Thought: That is the most correct and effective answer to the 
question: to whom is a duty owed.   
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APPENDIX158 
Proposed Legislation: Representative King’s legislation has been edited 
and tailored to bestow a legal duty upon individuals in the most limited of 
circumstances. The bill, as introduced during the 2019 legislative session, and 
as likely will be introduced in upcoming sessions if, and until, it is passed, reads 
as the following: 
 
Representative Brian S. King proposes the following substitute bill: 
 
911 RESPONSIBILITIES IN AN EMERGENCY 
2019 GENERAL SESSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
Chief Sponsor: Brian S. King 
Senate Sponsor:  ____________ 
 
     LONG TITLE 
     General Description: 
          This bill relates to the duty to contact emergency services in an 
emergency. 
 
     Highlighted Provisions: 
          This bill: 
          ▸   defines terms; 
          ▸    makes it a class B misdemeanor to fail to contact emergency 
services in the event of a crime or another emergency subject to certain 
exceptions; 
          ▸    prohibits a prosecutor from basing charges for commission 
of an offense other than the offense created in this bill on an 
individual's failure to contact emergency services; 
          ▸   amends provisions of the Good Samaritan Act to provide 
immunity from liability to an individual who contacts emergency 
services in accordance with the requirements of this bill; 
          ▸     addresses civil liability issues related to this bill; and 
          ▸     makes technical changes. 
 
     Money Appropriated in this Bill: None 
 
     Other Special Clauses: None      
 
Utah Code Sections Affected: 
     AMENDS: 
          78B-4-501, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2018, Chapter 62 
 
158 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-1101 (West 1953). 
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     ENACTS: 
          76-9-1101, Utah Code Annotated 1953  
________________________________________ 
 
     Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
          Section 1. Section 76-9-1101 is enacted to read: 
    
Part 11. Failure to Provide Assistance 
 
76-9-1101.  Failure to provide assistance. 
          (1) As used in this section: 
          (a) (i) “Assistance” means making reasonable effort to contact 
paramedics, fire protection, law enforcement, or other appropriate 
emergency services. 
          (ii) “Assistance” does not include action that places the 
individual taking the action, or another individual, in danger. 
          (b) “Emergency” means that an individual is suffering from 
serious bodily injury and is in need of assistance. 
          (c) “Legal privilege” means any privilege designated by 
common law, statute, or rule of evidence. 
          (d) “Serious bodily injury” means injury that involves a 
substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, 
protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental 
faculty. 
          (2) An individual is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if the 
individual: 
          (a) observes that a crime has occurred or is occurring or that an 
emergency is occurring; 
          (b) has personal knowledge that another individual is suffering 
serious bodily injury resulting from a crime or emergency; 
          (c) is able to provide reasonable assistance to the individual 
described in Subsection (2)(b); and 
          (d) fails to provide reasonable assistance to the individual 
described in Subsection (2)(b). 
          (3) An individual is not guilty of violating Subsection (2) if the 
individual reasonably believes another individual has, or likely has, 
already provided or is providing reasonable assistance to the 
individual described in Subsection (2)(b). 
          (4) Notwithstanding any contrary provision of state law, a 
prosecutor may not use an individual’s violation of Subsection (2) as 
the basis for charging the individual with another offense. 
          (5) This section does not create an independent basis for civil 
liability for failure to provide the assistance described in this section. 
          (6) The fact that an individual is charged Ĥ→ or convicted ←Ĥ 
with a crime under this section may not be used to establish that the 
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individual violated a duty on which a claim for personal injuries may 
be based. 
          (7) Subsection (2) does not apply to the extent that an individual 
is prohibited from providing assistance by a legal privilege. 
          Section 2. Section 78B-4-501 is amended to read: 
 
78B-4-501.  Good Samaritan Law. 
          (1) As used in this section: 
          (a) “Child” means an individual of such an age that a reasonable 
person would perceive the individual as unable to open the door of a 
locked motor vehicle, but in any case younger than 18 years of age. 
          (b) “Emergency” means an unexpected occurrence involving 
injury, threat of injury, or illness to a person or the public, including 
motor vehicle accidents, disasters, actual or threatened discharges, 
removal or disposal of hazardous materials, and other accidents or 
events of a similar nature. 
          (c) “Emergency care” includes actual assistance or advice 
offered to avoid, mitigate, or attempt to mitigate the effects of an 
emergency. 
          (d) “First responder” means a state or local: 
          (i) law enforcement officer, as defined in Section 53-13-103; 
          (ii) firefighter, as defined in Section 34A-3-113; or 
          (iii) emergency medical service provider, as defined in Section 
26-8a-102. 
          (e) “Motor vehicle” means the same as that term is defined in 
Section 41-1a-102. 
          (2) A person who renders emergency care at or near the scene 
of, or during, an emergency, gratuitously and in good faith, or as 
required under Section 76-9-1101, is not liable for any civil damages 
or penalties as a result of any act or omission by the person rendering 
the emergency care, unless the person is grossly negligent or caused 
the emergency. 
          (3) (a) A person who gratuitously, and in good faith, assists a 
governmental agency or political subdivision in an activity described 
in Subsections (3)(a)(i) through (iii) is not liable for any civil damages 
or penalties as a result of any act or omission, unless the person 
rendering assistance is grossly negligent in: 
          (i) implementing measures to control the causes of epidemic and 
communicable diseases and other conditions significantly affecting 
the public health, or necessary to protect the public health as set out in 
Title 26A, Chapter 1, Local Health Departments; 
          (ii) investigating and controlling suspected bioterrorism and 
disease as set out in Title 26, Chapter 23b, Detection of Public Health 
Emergencies Act; and 
          (iii) responding to a national, state, or local emergency, a public 
health emergency as defined in Section 26-23b-102, or a declaration 
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by the president of the United States or other federal official requesting 
public health-related activities. 
         [(3)](b) The immunity in this Subsection (3) is in addition to any 
immunity or protection in state or federal law that may apply. 
          (4) (a) A person who uses reasonable force to enter a locked and 
unattended motor vehicle to remove a confined child is not liable for 
damages in a civil action if all of the following apply: 
          (i) the person has a good faith belief that the confined child is in 
imminent danger of suffering physical injury or death unless the 
confined child is removed from the motor vehicle; 
          (ii) the person determines that the motor vehicle is locked and 
there is no reasonable manner in which the person can remove the 
confined child from the motor vehicle; 
          (iii) before entering the motor vehicle, the person notifies a first 
responder of the confined child; 
          (iv) the person does not use more force than is necessary under 
the circumstances to enter the motor vehicle and remove the confined 
child from the vehicle; and 
          (v) the person remains with the child until a first responder 
arrives at the motor vehicle. 
         [(4)](b) A person is not immune from civil liability under this 
Subsection (4) if the person fails to abide by any of the provisions of 
Subsection (4)(a) or commits any unnecessary or malicious damage to 
the motor vehicle. 
 
 
 
